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ABSTRACT
The importance of using big accounting firm may depend 
on governance level in each company. If they have good 
corporate governance and have high concern on improving 
governance, the company may prefer to use big accounting 
firm (Lina & Liub 2009; and Houqe, Zijl, Dunstan, & 
Karim 2015). State-owned enteprise (“BUMN”) may have 
higher agency problem as their objective is people welfare 
but still profit-oriented. So, they have higher ability to 
defer the earning than other company. We include research 
sample of all BUMN which listed on Indonesia stock 
exchange (IDX) except those which participate in banking 
and financial industry (JASICA 8). By using discretionary 
accrual as proxy of lower earning quality and accounting 
firm size as proxy of audit quality, we found negative 
relationship between those variable. In other words, if the 
company want to improve their earning quality they should 
consider on usinge big accounting firm. In additional 
analysis, we found that big accounting firm able to reduce 
management intention to defer earning and tax expense. I 
encourage government of Indonesia (“the Government”)to 
advise BUMN to consider on using big accounting firm to 
improve earning quality and reduce fraudulent act through 
financial reporting by management.
 
1. INTRODUCTION
Indonesian  and the Government delegate the 
management of country’s resource to BUMN. Most of 
BUMN operate in industry which related to people welfare 
such as natural resources, infrastructure, telecommunication, 
etc. Although they are profit-oriented, the Government may 
use their right as shareholder to controls the operation align 
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with the regulation. As result, based on ministry 
of BUMN regulation (PER-04/MBU/2014) the 
Government creates incentive for management 
of BUMN to meet the goals. The incentives are 
decided based on previous year achievement. 
Furthermore, the Government add additional 
incentive for BUMN which able to compete 
in foreign market and operate based on global 
standard. So, BUMN may defer the earnings 
or penetrate foreign market by using lower 
price so the management may have higher 
benefit with lower tax expense due to lower 
sales. Chen, Chen, Lobo, & Wang (2011) argue 
that BUMN may not have higher motivation 
to achieve high profit than non-BUMN by 
managing their profit. However, BUMN still 
have serious agency problem because they only 
focus on profit and management does not have 
opportunity to gain big portion of company’s 
share (Tang, Chow, & Lau 1999).
Some countries (e.g. Indonesia) regulate 
the listed companies to rotate the accounting 
firm each six year and partner each three year. 
However, the other countries which decide not 
to rotate the accounting firm (e.g. Australia, 
USA, and others) still regulate the partner 
rotation. Bandyopadhyay, Chen, & Yu (2014) 
argue that the benefit on rotating the accounting 
firm is less than the cost of the rotation. Their 
finding may not applicable for some countries 
due to the difference on quality.
According to Transparency International, 
corruption, openness, and governance score in 
Indonesia is low. Government audit or internal 
reporting division is not sufficient to ensure the 
financial report has properly reported based 
on accounting standard on BUMN, there may 
be conflict of interest because the auditor is 
supervised by the Government. Public investor 
will be suffered from this condition because 
management of BUMN may falsify the financial 
information. This will reduce stakeholder trust 
on BUMN then the cost of capital will be 
higher (Persakis & Iatridis 2015). To anticipate 
this condition, BUMN need to engaged more 
independent, professional, and competent 
accounting firm.
This research does not discuss about the 
cost and benefit from accounting firm rotation 
and partner rotation but to provide empirical 
evidence on the relationship between audit 
quality and aggresivity of financial reporting. 
This research contributes to the literature 
on providing conclusion from specific 
company such as BUMN which has unique 
characteristic. To conclude, I noted the usage of 
big accounting firm will reduce the probability 
of management to manipulate or falsify the 
financial information. We also recommend that 
the BUMN should keep using big accounting 
firm whether or not they should be rotated. 
When the rotation applied, it should be rotated 
to another big accounting firm. This may 
increase the quality of financial statement.
This paper devided into 5 sections. On 
section 2, this research describe about literature 
review and hypothesis development. Sample 
selection and research method explained on 
section 3. Section 4 describe about statistic 
descriptive and the result of this empirical 
research. Then on section 5, I provide conclusion 
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based on empirical result and provide the 
recommendation from this research.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Accounting firm in Indonesia 
In Indonesia, the legal entity of accounting 
firm is partnership not limited liability. They are 
allowed to use either the local partnership name 
or global affiliates. Accounting firm allowed 
to change its name if there is big changes 
on the composition of partner in the firm so 
they able to extend the audit period limitless. 
However, the requirement is rarely used by 
small company without doing merger as they 
only have small number of staff in average. 
This make the objective regulation on rotation 
may not achieved. However, Li (2010) found 
that decrease in independence (accounting 
conservatism) only happened at small company. 
So there is probability that the accounting firm 
maintain their audit quality because most of 
the listed companies (especially BUMN) have 
higher assets compare to the other non-listed 
company and non-BUMN in similar industry.
Market type of accounting firm is oligopoly 
where only few accounting firms owned 
most of the market share. Generally, many 
accounting research classify accounting firm 
into big and non-big four. The big four of 
accounting firms are PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, 
dan KPMG1. Indonesia affiliates from those 
1 The definition of accounting firms may various, 
Bandyopadhyay, Chen, & Yu (2014) include more 
local accounting firm (whether affiliated or not) 
because based on public accounting institution 
on China, those accounting firm have big market 
share. 
accounting firm network are KAP Tanudiredja 
Wibisana Rintis & Rekan, KAP Osman Bing 
Satrio & Eny, KAP Purwantono, Suherman & 
Surja, dan KAP Siddharta & Widjaja. As the 
big accounting firm has resource to increase 
audit quality provided to their client, DeAngelo 
(1981) conclude that bigger accounting firm 
will increase the audit quality. Comprix and 
Huang (2015) found more specific conclusion 
that smaller accounting firm does not have 
ability to prevent opportunistic management 
but they do not found evidence that shows the 
smaller accounting firm assist or advise their 
client to do fraud.
2.2 Accounting firm rotation in Indonesia
Decision on choosing accounting firm 
is based on general meeting of shareholder 
(“RUPS”) in each company. Based law no. 
19/2003 article 71, ministry of state owned 
enterprises Indonesia allow BUMN (limited 
liability) to choose the accounting firm on RUPS 
unless for specific type of BUMN. BUMN 
also should comply with ministry of finance’s 
regulation no. 423/KMK.06/2002 which 
amended to PMK no. 17/2008 which regulate 
the duration of auditing services. The service 
should be no longer than five consecutive years 
(six year based on PMK). The regulation also 
stated that the duration of audit partner should 
be no longer than three consecutive years with 
cooling period of one year. However, if the 
accounting firm is currently audit the Company 
more than five years in 2003, they allowed 
to finish they service in the current year. 
Moreover, there is specific sentence to be given 
by the authority for listed company which does 
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not comply with this regulation because they 
concern on quality of financial report.
Audit partner rotation is regulated by 
authority in most of country in the world, 
and they have different view on accounting 
firm rotation. However, European Commision 
and US’ PCAOB considering to implements 
rotation obligation on the accounting firm 
recently. The different views come from 
assumption that the rotation able to maintain 
the independence and quality of accounting 
firm, however some countries like Australia 
and USA view that cost of the rotation is less 
than its benefit (Bandyopadhyay et al. 2014).
Big accounting firms have a big resource 
so they do not need to worry by changing its 
business strategy significantly if they lose 
profitable client. This is one of the reason on 
why many researcher use this proxy to control 
the pressure from client (client importance) 
(Bandyopadhyay et al. 2014; dan Wahyuni & 
Fitriany 2012). By observing the advantage of 
big accounting firm, Carey & Simnet (2006) 
shows that audit quality in Australia increases 
because the impact of partner rotation. This 
research does not discuss those different views 
but to find the empiric evidence on relationship 
between audit quality and earning quality.
2.3 Audit quality and earning quality
On company level, by choosing competent 
accounting firm may signal the stakeholder 
that management has keep good corporate 
governance so the cost of capital will relatively 
lower compare to company which has weaker 
corporate governance. However, as rational 
people, management loss some of their chance 
to extract resources from their company for 
personal needed. So, in general, the Company 
which has weaker corporate governance 
will choose accounting firm which has lower 
competency, vice versa (Lina & Liub 2009; and 
Houqe, Zijl, Dunstan, & Karim 2015).
Earning quality usually measured by 
measuring the accretion of management to 
falsify the financial information or the chances 
on doing earning management. Earning 
management is fraudulent act which performed 
by the management through financial 
reporting fraudlent to influence the short term 
performance of company. One of the proxies of 
earning quality is using discretionary accrual. 
If the balance is high (in absolute amount), 
the earning quality of the financial report is 
low because management able to manage 
transaction without any business essence or 
defer the transaction. 
There are several methods on calculating 
discretionary accrual so we use a method which 
aligns with research objectives. This research 
use Dechow model because it does not require 
special specification between discretionary 
accrual with corporate financial performace 
(adjusting their performance with industry 
performance) and defer the excess performace. 
Dechow model also more appropriate to be 
used because this research does not observe the 
changes on company’s value in the long run 
and operating performance in specific but the 
implication of using big accounting firm.
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2.4 Accounting firm choices on BUMN 
Earning quality in each BUMN is different 
because each manager has different views. 
However, Chen et al. (2011) argue that BUMN 
does not have higher motivation to manage their 
earning recognition than other listed company. 
So BUMN has bigger agency problem because 
they are profit oriented by nature but the 
managers does not have enough ownership 
share on BUMN (Tang et al. 1999).
Similar with most of the company, BUMN 
has a right to choose the accounting firm so 
the relationship between accounting firm 
and client may have impact on the decision 
on choosing accounting firm and its scope of 
work. Apparently, the relationship may reduce 
audit quality but Ball, Tyler, & PeterWells 
(2015) found factors that can increase audit 
quality during audit engagement. Those factors 
are rotation on accounting firm’s team member 
and accounting staff, internal quality review of 
each accounting firm, and risk of reputation loss 
for accounting firm (Davis, Soo, & Tompeter 
2009). Audit team member and accounting 
staff rotation may reduce negative interpersonal 
relationship which could reduce independence 
and professional scepticism so it will maintain 
audit quality. Beside that, accounting firm 
with good internal quality review control 
will maintain their quality because there is 
internal sanction for the breacher. For example, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Indonesia has 
Engagement Compliance Reviews (ECR) which 
the breacher should expain their judgement 
during audit. If they failed to explain, it may 
have impact in their carrier as it included on KPI 
(key performance indicators). Each accounting 
firm have different assessment on their client 
or prospective client. Audit engagement on 
BUMN is considered as high risk because they 
have higher exposure (listed and BUMN). 
This make accounting firm should keep their 
independence during engagement because if 
there is audit failure it will be blown up by mass 
media. If there is audit failure, the reputation 
will damaged similar with enron case.
Li (2010) found more comprehensive 
conclusion about the relationship between 
audit tenure and independence (accounting 
conservatism) which negative in small 
company. The research also concludes that 
client with higher audit fee (high client 
importance) play important role on long run 
relationship between auditor and client. It 
wil make smaller accounting firm has higher 
pressure to meet client’s demand. To find 
whether big accounting firm able to reduce fraud 
on financial reporting (earning management) so 
we develop hypothesis as follow:
H: Big accounting firm able to maintain 
earning quality through financial statement 
in BUMN.
3. RESEARCH METHOD
3.1 Sample selection
This research use financial data from 
Thompson Reuters’ Datastream (“Datastream”) 
but the unavailable datas (e.g. accounting firm 
used) are obtained manually from financial 
statement on each sample. The information on 
accounting firm used is based on accounting 
firm’s opinion letter on final audited financial 
statement on respective year. 
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This research includes all listed BUMN 
for 10 years from the implementation year 
of regulation on rotation starts (2003-2012). 
To avoid inconsistency, if the sample listed 
after 2003, the observation years are from 
the listing year to 2012. BUMN on banking 
and financial service industry are excluded as 
sample because those companies are highly 
regulated, using different cash flow process and 
accrual recognition compare to other industry. 
As result, the samples used for this research 
are 109 observations (14 company). Please see 
table 1 below.
Table 1
Research sample
Quote Industry* Listing date Observation
ANTM Mining 1997 10
PTBA Mining 2002 10
TINS Mining 1995 10
KRAS Basic industry and chemical 2010 3
SMGR Basic industry and chemical 1991 10
INAF Consumer goods industry 2001 10
KAEF Consumer goods industry 2001 10
ADHI Property, real estate, and building construction 2004 9
PTPP Property, real estate, and building construction 2010 3
WIKA Property, real estate, and building construction 2007 6
GIAA Infrastructure, utilities & transportation 2011 2
JSMR Infrastructure, utilities & transportation 2007 6
PGAS Infrastructure, utilities & transportation 2003 10
TLKM Infrastructure, utilities & transportation 1995 10
  
*Industry classification is based on Jakarta Stock Industrial Classification 
(“JASICA”). TOTAL 109
3.2 Definition of audit quality and earning   
      earning quality 
Basically, the proxy of audit quality is 
fluctuative because it influenced by the audit 
competence, the depth of audit procedure, and 
the corporate governance. Previous studies 
(Francis, Maydew, & Sparks 1999; and Teoh 
& Wong 1993) argue that big accounting firm 
able to provide better audit quality for client. 
Signing partner on big accounting firm able 
to provide disclaimer, adverse, and qualified 
audit opinion the company if management 
unable to provide explanation and evidence on 
misappropriate accounting practice (DeAngelo 
1981). Hence audit quality (accounting firm 
choice) can be proxied by dummy variable 
with 1 for big accounting firm and vice versa.
Earning quality on this research define 
by how big the discretionary accrual on each 
sample. The use of discretionary accrual is 
commonly used by previous study which in 
general able to prove that the relationship 
between audit quality and earning quality is 
positive (Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang 2003; and 
Jiang, Habib, & Zhou 2015). Previous researchs 
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use various discretionary accrual measurements 
like the nominal value, the absolute value, or 
positive/negative value (with the indicator). 
This research use absolute value because 
Kim, Chung, & Firth (2003) and Francis et al. 
(1999) found that manager decision on doing 
earning management may endogenous which 
means it may depend on other circumtances. 
Those management’s actions does not oversees 
by auditor (internal or external) but also the 
shareholders which try to mitigate that risk 
by using competent auditor. We do not use the 
calculated value because it is more suitable 
for specific sample such as Chinese which has 
stricter regulation on corporate action in stock 
exchange (Bandyopadhyay et al. 2014).
The proxy of discretionary accrual is 
developed by Jones (1991) which modified by 
researchers like Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney 
(1995), Kothari, Leone, & Wasley (2005), and 
others. Ayers, Jiang, & Yeung (2006) argue 
that the advantage from using modified jones 
(Dechow) model compared to performance-
matched jones (Kothari) model is Dechow 
model does not require further specification 
between correlation between discreationary 
accrual and financial performace of the 
company compared to the average industrial 
performance. Moreover, Dechow model 
may better used for this research because 
this research does not see the increase of 
company’s value on the long run and operating 
performance in specific but the implication 
from using big accounting firm. The model of 
discretionary accrual proposed by Dechow et 
al (1995) are the residual between equation of 
total accrual and its component or estimated by 
using model below:
Total accrualit = α + β1 (Δsalesit – 
Δreceivablesit) + β2 PPEit
 
Where Δsales is the changes of sales from 
previous period observation, Δreceivables 
is the changes of receivables from previous 
period observation, PPE is net balance of 
property, plant and equipment, and total accrual 
is the difference between net income and 
cashflow from operating activity. All variable 
is denominated by using lagged total assets. 
The residual of dechow model in this paper is 
estimated (regressed) on each industry (JASICA 
/ Jakarta Stock Industrial Classification) because 
lack of annual observation. This reseach use 
absolute value of discretionary accrual.
3.3 Research model
By using BUMN as sample, this research 
estimates the hypothesis by using following 
model.
DACCit = αi + β1 BIG4it + β2 EXPRit + β3 SIZEit 
+ β4 CFOit + β5 ROAit + β6 AGEit + β7 SHARit + 
β8 POWRit + εit
Where DACC is discretionary accrual and BIG4 
is audit quality (see 3.2 for detail explanation).
Different with previous studies 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; dan Jenkins 
& Velury, 2008), this paper does not control 
familiarization auditor with audit tenure 
because audit engagement in Indonesia should 
be rotated at maximum five (six year based 
on amended regulation). To compensate that, 
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this paper uses percentage of audit tenure 
by big accounting firm on observation time 
(EXPR) because although they have different 
methodology, their credibility and competency 
almost similar. This proxy is inline with research 
objective and able to control the company’s 
expertise on assisting BIG4 on perfoming audit 
procedure.
Research conduct by Lawrence, Minutti-
Meza, & Zang (2011) conclude that the 
difference on quality between BIG4 and non-
BIG4 may depend on their client characteristic. 
So, if the client assists the auditor on doing their 
procedure, there may smaller gap between audit 
quality done by BIG4 and non-BIG4. Hence, 
it is important to include control variable that 
indicate company’s characteristic such as SIZE, 
CFO, AGE, and ROA. Furthermore, to control 
pressure on accounting firm’s independence, 
this research include control variable such as 
SHAR and POWR.
SIZE measured by natural logarithm from 
total assets to control company’s resources. 
Similar with Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014), 
this paper use variable CFO (cash flow from 
operating activity) because it may negatively 
correlated with accrual. ROA is included to 
control the profitability of companies which 
show how big the intention of the companies 
to maximise the profit. Both ROA and CFO are 
divided by lag total assets. AGE shows how 
long the companies listed on IDX (Indonesia 
stock exchange) to control the attention of 
the stakeholder. Listed companies should 
disclose more information (e.g. annual report 
information) than unlisted companies and the 
attention is higher for long listed companies.
Variable SHAR used to control company’s 
experience on industry specific company. 
This paper use variable POWR to control 
the pressure from client. SHAR measured by 
using portion of total asset of the compay to 
total asset in related industry, where POWR is 
the portion of total asset compare to total asset 
audited by same accounting firm. SHAR and 
POWR calculated on each year by using data 
from Datastream for all listed BUMN.
4. RESEARCH RESULT
Desctiptive statistics on listed BUMN on 
IDX is described at Table 2. DACC has big 
variation by seeing on maximum and minimum 
value. As the average value of DACC is higher 
than the median, it shows that most of BUMN 
doing more aggressive financial reporting 
compare to the other. By seeing the median of 
BIG4 amounted 1 and based on average value 
of 60.55%, it shows that most of listed BUMN 
use big accounting firm. This result is consistent 
with EXPR which shows that BUMN may use 
BIG4 based on previous engagement. Auditor 
experience on industry is different on each 
accounting firm because the standard deviation 
of SHAR is big. Maximum value of those 
variable much bigger than minimum value 
which shows that there is BUMN which use less 
experienced accounting firm. This may result 
on reliability of financial statement because 
that accounting firm may has less competence. 
By seeing the maximum value of POWR of 1, it 
shows that there is auditor (smaller accounting 
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firm) which audit one company on IDX which 
also BUMN. This may causes the company has 
higher ability to disobey and/or negotiate the 
procedure audit.
On average, SIZE is relatively higher 
compare to other company, it indicate that 
BUMN is one of the market leader in their 
industry. Given average value of ROA in BUMN 
is higher than inflation level in Indonesia 
(approximately 7% in last 10 years) shows 
that they have good resource and participate 
in profitable market to generate profit so they 
are profit oriented. Average value of AGE is 
higher than its median because most of BUMN 
has listed on IDX. By considering only those 
factors, investor will attracted to invest on 
BUMN because they have high assets, ROA, 
and high continuity. This may add a pressure 
for management to create higher profit.
Table 2 
Statistic descriptive
 DACC BIG4 EXPR SIZE CFO ROA AGE SHAR POWR
Mean 0.0454 0.6055 0.6294 29.5834 0.1346 0.1006 7.5505 0.2097 0.2519
Std. dev 0.0428 0.4910 0.4484 1.3032 0.1277 0.0924 5.3324 0.1743 0.3129
Min. 0.0009 0 0 26.8894 -0.1972 -0.2254 0 0.0051 0.0045
25% 0.0102 0 0 28.6382 0.0414 0.0370 3 0.0466 0.0329
Median 0.0280 1 1 29.5674 0.1174 0.0651 7 0.1427 0.0734
75% 0.0807 1 1 30.4144 0.2382 0.1465 11 0.3809 0.3892
Max. 0.1413 1 1 32.3431 0.4800 0.4376 21 0.5533 1
Table 3 shows the regression result by 
using fixed effect model with robust standard 
error. Variable BIG4 has negative relationship 
with DACC (dependend variable), in average 
observation, changes from non-big accounting 
firm to big accounting firm may increase the 
earning quality. As result, the fraudlent of 
financial statement is lower by 0,0234 point 
(DACC measurement) or there is increasing on 
earning quality. This parameter is big enough 
compare to average value of DACC (0,0454). 
This conclusion is consistent with previous 
research where they argue that big accounting 
firm may provide better audit quality for their 
client (Francis, Maydew, & Sparks, 1999; dan 
Teoh & Wong, 1993).
Regression result on variable control shows 
that SIZE positively correlated with DACC, 
however AGE has negative relationship. The 
bigger company has bigger resource such 
as high skill staff and bigger political power 
(Zimmerman, 1983). Bigger company also has 
ability to customize their business strategy so 
they may has a tendency to do fraud. Increasing 
growth of BUMN 1% may increase fraud level 
by 0,00026 with DACC measurement. On the 
other side, company’s experience may increase 
earning quality. The longer BUMN listed on 
IDX may reduce fraud level by 0,006 annualy 
on DACC measurement. The longer companies 
listed on IDX, it will attract more stakeholders 
which monitor their activity such as public 
investor, mass media, researcher, and others.
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In this paper, we do not found relationship 
on some control variable such as EXPR, CFO, 
ROA, SHAR, and POWR does not have impact 
on earning quality. Profitable company is not 
always doing fraudlent on financial reporting. 
This is becaue BUMN operate in profitable 
and strategic industry such as mining, 
infrastructure, and others. The expertise on 
BUMN to assist audit process also does not 
increase earning quality because the decision is 
made on top level management. Although the 
audit process goes smooth, if management has 
power to influence audit process, the quality 
may lower. Moreover, this paper shows that 
SHAR and POWR is not important factor on 
earning quality.
Table 3 
Regression result
Variable Prediction Coeficient t-stat
BIG4 # - -0.0243 -2.46**
EXPR - -0.0198 -1.66
SIZE + 0.0259 3.24***
CFO - 0.0227 0.78
ROA + 0.0390 1.1
AGE ? -0.0058 -5.88***
SHAR - 0.0001 0.01
POWR + -0.0217 -1.3
_CONSTANT ? -0.6499 -2.87***
  
R 
Square
0.2671   
N 109   
***Significant on 1%  
** Significant on 5%  
* Significant on 10%  
# The coefficient is similar with marginal effect estimation
4.1 Additional analysis
By using same observation, researcher 
perform robustness test by using only positive 
and negative balance on DACC. Compare to 
main research, this test may able to provide 
more specific findings on the impact of big 
accounting firm to reduce BUMN strategy 
on reduce earning for tax purpose or increase 
the earning to attract investor. The regression 
result by using negative DACC has positive 
relationship so it may conclude that big 
accounting firm able to reduce company ability 
to reduce their earnings. Unfortunately, we do 
not found conclusion on DACC positif because 
the observation is low because the model 
unable to estimated. Additional analysis
5. CONCLUSION
This research test the relationship between 
audit quality and earning quality on listed 
BUMN on IDX. The findings are BUMN 
able to maintain audit quality by using big 
accounting firm which may reduce manager’s 
ability to manipulate or doing aggressive 
financial reporting. In additional analysis, this 
paper found that big accounting firms are able 
to reduce management ability on reduce the 
earning.
Government may advise BUMN including 
non-listed BUMN and other government related 
entity to use more competent auditor such 
as big accounting firm. Big accounting firm 
has better audit procedure and able to provde 
recommendation on any control deficiency 
which may has potential material impact 
on financial statement. They also has better 
experience on auditing bigger company and 
industry so they understand the best practice 
which should be done on the Company. As 
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result, BUMN may able to present unqualified 
financial statement and increase corporate 
governance.
Next research should include listed and 
non-listed BUMN so it will provide better 
conclusion. Furthermore, in measuring 
auditor’s expertise, the researcher may include 
all client audited by the accounting firm. 
Although dechow model more suitable to use 
on this resource, next reseach should consider 
on their additional analysis to compare the 
result with Kothari, Kaznik, Jones and other 
measurement of discretionary accrual.
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